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This chapter deals with the response of populist actors in the UK to the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Populism in the UK is divided among Nigel Farage and Prime Minister Boris Johnson. 
Farage and Johnson, both campaigning for Britain to leave the EU, had distinct responses to 
the pandemic, the former being more in line with common themes of populist discourse. True 
to his anti-immigrant stance, Farage antagonized national and international agencies for 
allegedly smuggling migrants into the UK, blamed China for the pandemic, and echoed the 
US president Trump’s trade war in calling for a boycott on Chinese goods. Farage criticised 
government lockdown and social distancing measures for allegedly being too harsh. In doing 
so, Farage employed common far right conspiracist tropes and populist rhetoric aimed at UK 
politicians, the EU, and China. Johnson on the other hand, displayed a rather measured 
response and did not engage in antagonizing political entities. 
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The outbreak of the pandemic in the UK was perceived to be inevitable as other European countries, 
most notably Italy, had already succumbed to COVID-19. The Johnson government explained that 
the United Kingdom (UK) was two weeks behind Italy and the NHS could be overwhelmed by 
COVID-19 very much like the Italian health system had been. By mid-March 2020, it became clear 
in the UK that the pandemic was no longer a ‘Chinese problem’. Nevertheless, the UK government 
seemed from the beginning insufficiently prepared. The government was slow in stopping 
international flights from regions with high infection rates, which probably contributed to the spread 
of COVID-19. Early in the pandemic, there was a shortage in personal protective equipment, causing 
hundreds of the NHS staff to be infected with the virus. These factors provided a fertile ground for 
populist politics. Despite of this fact, Farage and his Brexit Party kept a rather low profile during the 
pandemic. This was due to two reasons. First, populism in the UK is mostly geared towards Brexit. 
Therefore, the pandemic at least at the beginning was not on Farage’s radar. Second, UK populists’ 
influence on public opinion is mostly limited to Brexit. This does not mean that Farage abstained 
from politicising the issue and using it to advance his agenda.   
 
 
1. Political context 
The British variant of the latest wave of populism engulfing the world in the past few decades can be 
traced back to the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP). UKIP was founded in 1993 by 
members of the Anti-Federalist League. At the beginning, UKIP was considered a splinter group of 
the Conservative Party, and was originally designed as a single-issue, policy-seeking party having 
the sole aim of facilitating the UK’s exit from the European Union (EU) (Ford & Goodwin, 2014; 
Rekawek, 2015). Since its early days, UKIP sought to pressure the Conservative party into adopting 
a harsher stance on Europe, opposed plans for further European integration and sought the withdrawal 
of the UK from the EU (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). UKIP followed into the footsteps of an established 
British political tradition of Euroscepticism (Bale, 2018). Although some scholars argue that the 
marriage between Euroscepticism and populism was present from the first stages of UKIP’s historical 
development (Tournier-Sol, 2015), others suggest that populism was rather a subsequent, although 
invaluable addition to the party’s repertoire (Taggart, 2017; Bale, 2018).  
 
 
By 2010, UKIP switched to being a vote-seeking party mainly due to the contribution of then-party 
leader Nigel Farage who popularized UKIP’s single issue by connecting it to populist backlash toward 
current immigration policies. This afforded UKIP to set the limelight on the longstanding issue the 
party was promoting ever since its inception, and which never before truly captured the full attention 
of the British electorate (Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Tournier-Sol, 2015; Bale 2018). Banking on voters’ 
understanding that leaving the EU would increase the possibility of restricting immigration, UKIP, 
as the only party openly advocating exit from the EU, could therefore credibly signal that they mean 
business (Rekawek, 2015; Bale, 2018). Nigel Farage’s appeal to voters was straightforwardly right-
wing populist, anti-establishment, nativist, neo-nostalgic, and neo-traditionalist (Ford and Goodwin, 
2014; Reed, 2016; Breeze, 2019).  
For most of its existence so far, UKIP never really took off in the polls. The party started off with a 
meagre 1% of the vote in 1994 European Parliament (EP) election, while settling for a mere 0.3% of 
the vote in the 1997 general election. It was only after 2010 that UKIP experienced a surge in 
popularity, which culminated with the 2014 EP election, when UKIP won the first place in the popular 
vote by securing 27.5% of the votes (Ford and Goodwin, 2014). In the 2014 by-election, support for 
main parties (Labour, Liberal Democrats, and Conservatives) plummeted, while support for UKIP 
rose by 36% (Ford & Goodwin, 2014; Tournier-Sol, 2015). Ultimately, the biggest contribution of 
UKIP was in succeeding to pressure the Conservatives into holding an EU membership referendum 
(Rekawek, 2015; Taggart, 2017). The referendum was held on June 23, 2016, and Britain voted to 
leave the EU by a close margin, leading to a deeply polarized political environment ever since. After 
the referendum, support for UKIP practically collapsed. By then, however, Nigel Farage had already 
left UKIP, and, followed by several UKIP MEPs, in January 2019, formed the Brexit Party, which 
later that year ended up winning the 2019 EP election with 31.6% of the vote and 29 seats. 
Nigel Farage’s Brexit Party has clung onto the 2016 Leave campaign promises in its fight to see 
through Britain’s exit from the EU, as Brexit negotiations are set to be concluded by the end of 2020. 
Although largely debunked, Leave campaign slogans seem today as valid as ever, judging by Farage’s 
electoral success in EP elections, and by the overwhelming victory of Prime Minister (PM) Boris 
Johnson’s Conservative Party in the 2019 general election, after campaigning on the very same 
messaging (Tormey, 2020). The election result seemed a logical outcome of all the ‘good’ work done 
by the Leave campaign in 2016, of which Johnson was an integral part. The campaign used simple 
stories and false but intuitive narratives while depicting migrants and politicians alike in populist 
Manichean terms of outgroups competing for British resources. Similarly, the EU was portrayed as 
an imperialist superpower planning to subdue Britain. To all this, Brexit was supposed to be the 
answer, the magical one-shot win-all option, aptly summarized by PM Boris Johnson’s 2019 electoral 
motto ‘Get Brexit Done’. In this way, populism and Brexit came together and decided the election 
results. Finally, in July 2020, UKIP polled at about 2%, while the Brexit Party had garnered only 1% 
of popular support, once Brexit was finally being done. 
 
Table 2.1 Main UK political parties (>5% in the last European election)1 
Political party 2019 general election  2019 European election  
 Vote shares Seats Vote shares Seats 
In power     
The Conservative and Unionist Party 43.6% 365 9.1% 4 
     
In opposition      
The Labour Party 32.2% 203 14.1% 10 
Brexit Party 2% 0 30.5% 29 
Greens 2.7% 1 4% 7 
 
1 Because first-past-the-post system is used in general elections, the threshold for the UK case is calculated considering 
the European elections instead of the general elections. 
 
 
Liberal Democrats 11.5% 11 19.6% 16 
 
 
2. COVID-19 diffusion and political measures 
In the UK, during the first phase of the pandemic, the attention of the public and the media was 
focused on Italy, which was the first epicentre of the pandemic in Europe. This was despite the fact 
that the first COVID-19 diagnosis in the UK was recorded as early as 31 January. Accordingly, one 
can argue that the initial reaction of the public and the state authorities to the COVID-19 pandemic 
was rather weak. No quarantine or extra safety checks were introduced for international passengers 
arriving from Southeast Asia or Europe. As of March 18, the UK still did not impose a ban on non-
essential travel whereas the EU banned all non-essential travel from outside the European Union2. 
The only noticeable action of the government was to advise its citizens to abstain from any non-
essential travel for the next 30 days. It also advised its citizens abroad to return to the country if 
they can. Despite the pressure from the opposition, Boris Johnson declined to treat the situation as 
an emergency, which was also apparent in his unwillingness to hold a so-called Cobra meeting – 
namely meetings with Prime Minister advisers in times of national emergencies – even after the 
pandemic started to spread throughout Europe in late February.    
 
The second phase started in March where local cases with no travel history started to spike. As of 
March 10, 2020, the number of tests reached 26,000 with 373 people testing positive. Six people 
died because of COVID-19 by March 10. Only 18 days later, the government reported 17,089 
positive cases while the death toll reached 1,019 people. These figures included PM Johnson who 
tested positive on March 27, and who was hospitalised due to breathing difficulties. This new 
reality check compelled the government to reconsider its strategy. While the government previously 
insisted that based on scientific advice, a ‘herd immunity’ approach was the best strategy to deal 
with the pandemic, they had to backtrack from this position after heavy criticism and after an 
influential report from the Imperial College London. This report predicted that, if left unchecked, 
the government strategy would cause as much as 260,000 deaths and the NHS would most likely 
‘break’ under the increasing number of patients. Hence, the government had to announce a 
lockdown on March 23, 2020. Johnson announced that all non-essential shops must close effective 
immediately and people must stay at home. He also advised the people not to go to shopping except 
for essentials such as food and medicine. Despite these measures, the Johnson government was 
criticised for acting late as London had already buckled under the weight of the pandemic. 
Throughout April 2020, cases in the UK increased so much so that by the end of May 2020 it was 
clear that the UK was one of the worst performing countries in fighting the pandemic. The death 
toll in the UK passed 50,000 on June 2, making it the highest in Europe.  
  
 
2 PWC, COVID-19: Global travel restrictions, entry bans and quarantine measures, 18 March 2020. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Daily death toll and new cases in UK 
 
 
Source: European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control 
Phase 1: pre-Covid-19; Phase 2: spread and containment measures; Phase 3: contagion mitigation 
 
Table 2.2 COVID-19 pandemic in UK 
Cases 289,140 
Total deaths 40,883 
Total recovered N/A 
Cases for 1 M pop 4,260 
Deaths for 1 M pop 602 
Source: www.worldometers.info/coronavirus/ (update 10/6/2020) 
 
The UK started to flatten the curve towards the beginning of May, which enabled the government to 
introduce some relaxation measures to the lockdown. Thus, the third phase started on May 13, 
2020. Johnson encouraged people in England to go back to work if they cannot work from home. 
He also advised citizens to avoid public transport when possible. Other devolved nations, Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland however, did not rush to follow Johnson’s footsteps as their 
governments argued that it was still too early to introduce a relaxation of lockdown measures. This 
also signified the beginning of diverging approaches the devolved nations took during the third 
phase. Especially Scotland’s First Minister Nicola Sturgeon was quite cautious to follow the 10 
Downing Street as she argued that England was too hasty to open up the economy. Nevertheless, 
the situation has almost normalized all across the UK especially in July. Foreign flights to major 
hubs have resumed with important exceptions such as the US. Pubs, restaurants and hairdressers 




3. Populist discourse at the time of COVID-19 
Nigel Farage took the opportunity of the pandemic to fight for some questionable goals while 
deploying established right-wing populist tropes. The thematical proximity of right-wing populism 
to conspiracism as established in previous research (Bergmann, 2018) is also evident in the 
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Given that Nigel Farage had left his seat in the European Parliament (EP) as a result of Brexit before 
the pandemic captured the national awareness in Britain, most of his statements on COVID-19 have 
been uttered either in the media or posted on social media. 
Nigel Farage adapted his discourse to the COVID-19 crisis mainly in two ways. First, and probably 
least problematic, Farage criticised the latency with which the British government introduced 
measures to counteract the spread of the pandemic. He also criticised the government for providing 
the inadequate response of adopting a ‘herd immunity’ approach. To this end, he pointed out that PM 
Boris Johnson’s policy of herd immunity would likely lead to 400,000 thousand deaths, from his own 
estimates, or alternatively to 260,000 deaths, citing an estimate by the Imperial College London3. 
Second, his central position on the pandemic was twofold: (1) he argued against the lockdown and 
against what he believed were harsh enforcement measures, likening the UK government to East 
Germany (Farage’s Facebook page, 30/03/2020) while at the same time (2) decrying the 
government’s decision to both allow inbound flights during lockdown and the ‘daily import of 
spreaders’ from high-risk countries such as China, Italy, or the United States (US) (Farage’s Facebook 
page, 02/04/2020). Within his central position on the pandemic, he vilified China as the paradigmatic 
enemy of ‘the West’ and attempted to promote outrage over the silent ‘invasion’ of migrants on the 
beaches of England (Farage’s Facebook page, 20/05/2020). 
Farage echoed Trump in blaming China for the pandemic, claiming that the Chinese government 
caused COVID-19. He also called for a tougher stance on China4. For Farage, China was ‘a 
surveillance state that infected the world with a deadly disease’ (Farage’s Facebook page, 
20/04/2020) that expels American journalists and oppresses religious minorities, that caused three 
viruses (i.e., SARS, the swine flu, and COVID-19), and that initially suppressed the truth about 
COVID-19 costing thousands of lives worldwide. China is also held responsible for global pollution 
and was ultimately characterized by Farage as ‘this murderous atrocity that has brought the world 
such misery’5. He then assumed a novel role for his Brexit Party: to hold China to account.6 
During the pandemic, in an article peroration published in Newsweek.co.uk, Nigel Farage deployed 
most of the tropes associated with white supremacist conspiracy theories. These included: ‘the West’ 
(framed as a unified and distinct body in opposition to China); ‘the Left’ (an amorphous pseudo-
entity embodying all which does not conform to the right-wing populist notion of ‘the [in this case 
mainly white] people’) collaborating with proponents of ‘political correctness’; environmental 
movements such as ‘extinction rebellion’ (the youth movement that has supposedly ‘brought British 
cities to a standstill’) or the (imagined) ‘Green Lobby’ who are seen to inflict ‘chaos on our society’; 
and even the World Health Organization (WHO) is depicted as being pro-China. Farage ends his 
peroration by calling for an all-out boycott on Chinese products, as well as calling for PM Johnson 
to deny Chinese company Huawei the right to build Britain’s 5G network (Farage’s Facebook page, 
20/04/2020). He also claimed that the British establishment had previously sold Britain out to EU 
leaders in Brussels and is now selling Britain out to Beijing (Farage’s Facebook page, 19/04/2020).  
Farage’s populist anti- ‘Left’ discourse mirrored US president Trump’s attempt to pinpoint yet 
another term for the collectively conspiring enemy: ‘far-left fascism’. To this end, Farage referred 
to the government’s stay-at-home advice as ‘house arrest’ (Farage’s Facebook page, 30/03/2020). 
Farage portrayed ‘the Left’ and all its subsidiaries as conspiring to destroy the British way of life 
and to strip citizens’ rights and freedoms, as ‘the Left’ is beholden to Chinese interests and would 
not criticise the Chinese government in fear of losing lucrative business deals and that the political 
‘establishment’ has been ‘payed off by China’ (Farage’s Facebook page, 22/02/2020). ‘The Green 
Lobby’ was depicted as a malevolent agent to which Farage ascribed intentionality and emotion 
 
3 Farage, N., The Virus is Yet Another Reason to Rethink the West's Relationship With China. Newsweek, 18 March 
2020. 
4 Harris, K, Nigel Farage lashes out at China over coronavirus: ‘We need to get TOUGH!’. Express, 2 June 2020.  
5 Farage, N., The Virus is Yet Another Reason to Rethink the West's Relationship With China. Newsweek, 18 March 
2020. 
6 Harris, K, Nigel Farage lashes out at China over coronavirus: ‘We need to get TOUGH!’. Express, 2 June 2020. 
 
 
(e.g., ‘happy to inflict chaos’)7. He implicitly referred to alt-right conspiracy theories by mentioning 
‘globalists’ in relation to ‘the Left’ and to the establishment as promoting globalization against the 
will of the people (Farage’s Facebook page, 01/05/2020). Farage also blamed globalization for the 
pandemic partly because globalization allegedly leads powerful figures to play in the hands of the 
Chinese government8. 
 
Finally, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Farage engaged in fearmongering over a small number of 
migrants crossing the English Channel illegally. He breached government lockdown advice to travel 
100 miles to East Sussex to document the alleged migrant ‘invasion’9. After being reprimanded by 
the police for breaching social distancing rules, Farage called the police visit ‘lunacy’.10 He further 
suggested that migrants are carrying COVID-19 (reminiscent of established dehumanization 
strategies deployed by right-wing populists against migrants and refugees), and claimed that the 
media is silent about the ‘invasion’ (Farage’s Facebook page, 26/04/2020). He further claimed that 
French ships were ‘escorting’ migrant boats into British waters and tried to ‘cover it up’ (Farage’s 
Facebook page, 27/05/2020). He also called for a stop on flights bringing seasonal workers from 
Romania into western Europe as he suggested that seasonal workers might spread the virus in Britain 
(Farage’s Facebook page, 18/04/2020).  
 
 
4. The politicization of COVID-19 issue by populists 
During the pandemic, the Johnson government avoided using a discourse that could have 
contributed to the politicisation of the crisis. Instead, on several occasions, Johnson emphasized that 
the government would be guided by scientific advice. Indeed, early in the pandemic, the Chief 
Scientific Advisor Patrick Vallance became a household name as PM Johnson included him in the 
daily COVID-19 press conferences where Vallance explained the government strategy to fight the 
pandemic. When the herd immunity approach, initially cherished by the UK government, drew 
heavy criticism by the public health authorities (i.e. the Imperial College London report), the 
government overrode its initial decision and imposed a lockdown throughout the nation. 
Furthermore, unlike Nigel Farage or the Trump administration, the Johnson government was 
hesitant to put any blame on China. When conspiracy theories emerged that 5G is behind the spread 
of COVID-19, the Cabinet Secretary Michael Gove was quick to define these theories as 
‘dangerous nonsense’.11    
 
Unlike the government however, Nigel Farage chose to politicise the COVID-19 crisis early in the 
emergence phase. On January 23, Farage slammed the Johnson government for its lax response to 
the outbreak in relation to China.12 He suggested that all passengers coming from China should 
have their temperatures checked in the airports. Farage also differed from the government approach 
in terms of his take on the pandemic. While the government undermined the seriousness of the 
crisis mostly because of economic concerns, Farage opportunistically used the COVID-19 crisis to 
suggest a scale down to the UK’s relations with the EU and China. For instance, he argued that 
while the government could monitor flights from China landing back in the UK, it was not possible 
to monitor those flights landing from China in the rest of Europe. He therefore suggested that the 
EU freedom of movement did make the UK more vulnerable to the pandemic.13  
 
7 Farage, N., The Virus is Yet Another Reason to Rethink the West's Relationship With China. Newsweek, 18 March 
2020. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Nigel Farage, Talk Radio Interview, 30 April 2020. 
10 ‘Lunacy,’ says Nigel Farage after police visit over lockdown trip. Politico, 5 May 2020. 
11 Gove warns 5G-coronavirus conspiracy theory is ‘dangerous nonsense’. The Guardian, 4 April 2020. 
12 Nigel Farage ‘astonished’ at UK government’s response to coronavirus ‘just a leaflet?!’. Daily Express, 23 January 
2020.  




There is a certain overlap between the first phase (emergence phase) and the second phase 
(confrontation phase) as Farage moved onto the identification of actors who were responsible for 
the COVID-19 crisis in the UK. Farage suggested that those who were responsible for the UK’s 
crisis were China, the Johnson government, and migrants. Farage was in the same boat with Donald 
Trump in blaming China for the pandemic. He argued that before the pandemic, China was a 
surveillance state; now, it is a surveillance state that infected the world with a deadly disease 
(Farage’s Facebook page, 20/04/2020). In several statements and social media posts during April 
and May 2020, Farage accused China for the pandemic and asserted that China should let 
independent investigators into the country to reveal the true scope of its guilt during the spread of 
the virus. Farage also referred to China several times in his accusations levelled against the Johnson 
government and the establishment. He blamed the Johnson government for being soft on China 
despite China’s share in the pandemic. He suggested the government should learn from the Trump 
administration. After Trump’s announcement that the US is withdrawing its financial support from 
what Farage defined as the ‘pro-China’ WHO, he argued that the Johnson government should be 
ashamed of continuing to fund the WHO (Farage’s Facebook page, 14/04/2020). In fact, during the 
pandemic, Farage emerged as a vocal proponent of the US position on China’s role in the 
pandemic. Farage said that Trump was correct to define COVID-19 as the ‘Chinese virus’ because, 
he claimed, China was responsible for the outbreak.14  
 
A second target for Farage during the confrontation phase was the Johnson government. Along with 
his accusations against the government for being subordinated to China, Farage blamed the Johnson 
government for being incompetent and indecisive in the face of the COVID-19 crisis. After 
Johnson’s announcement in early March 2020 that no immediate steps would be taken against 
COVID-19, Farage stated that Johnson is failing to show leadership (Farage’s Facebook page, 
12/03/2020). Furthermore, on several occasions, Farage criticised the government over its 
lockdown decision, which was announced by PM Johnson on March 23, 2020. He likened the 
lockdown to a house arrest or home detention.15 Farage argued that while other measures such as 
wearing mask or keeping social distance were acceptable, the government decision to impose a total 
lockdown was going too far as a measure in the fight against the virus.  
 
Another target of Farage during the COVID-19 crisis was irregular and regular migrants. He 
claimed that COVID-19 diverted attention from what he perceived to be a serious problem. Farage 
suggested that during the pandemic there had been a ‘continuing flow of illegal migrants that makes 
many of us very angry’ (Farage’s Facebook page, 24/04/2020). According to Farage, the media was 
ignoring the flow of these immigrants crossing the English Channel, which he described as ‘the 
beginning of an invasion’ (Farage’s Facebook page, 08/05/2020). Farage presented these 
immigrants as potential COVID-19 spreaders by arguing that irregular migrants would be neither 
sent back nor quarantined. Farage also suggested that seasonal workers from abroad (generally from 
Romania or Poland) who come to the UK to pick fruit or vegetables must be stopped because they 
are potential spreaders of the virus. In addition, he argued, as many British workers were either out 
of their jobs or furloughed due to the COVID-19 crisis, they could easily replace the seasonal 
workers from abroad.  
 
In the following managing phase, which started in mid-May, Farage proposed several solutions to 
deal with the pandemic while criticizing the government for some of its policies. Unlike other populist 
leaders such as Trump or Bolsonaro, Farage did not despise face masks. On the contrary, he criticised 
the Johnson government for failing to enforce wearing face masks in the public. Farage argued that 
 
14 Nigel Farage facing backlash after blaming China for coronavirus pandemic. The National, 19 March 2020. 




anything that could help ease the lockdown (i.e. face masks) should be encouraged (Farage’s 
Facebook page, 16/04/2020). Farage also proposed to stop international flights to the UK whereas 
the government was reluctant to do so. Despite these proposals, it would be an exaggeration to claim 
that Nigel Farage had a comprehensive program to fight the COVID-19 crisis. Instead, his proposals 
were mostly ad hoc and mostly aiming to curb the severity of the lockdown in the UK. Rather, he 
benefited from the pandemic to frame China as the new enemy of ‘the West’ renewing the relevance 
of his Brexit Party in current affairs.  
As for PM Boris Johnson, aside from benefitting from the pronounced populist undertones of the pro-
Brexit campaign, and from decades of right-wing, pro-Brexit mainstream media (Cromby, 2019), any 
populist elements inside his discourse surrounding the pandemic were considerably toned down, 
arguably even non-existent. The mainstream media was also careful to avoid a populist tone in 
criticising the prime minister. Most of the criticisms towards the government was built upon the 
premise that the government paid too much attention to the economic implications of measures 
against the pandemic while overlooking scientific advice. In fact, the media’s insistence on 
publicizing the now-famous Imperial College London report on COVID-19, which argued that herd 
immunity could cause as much as 260,000 deaths, was probably a major factor in the government’s 




Nigel Farage used the pandemic to advance his goal of realizing a no-deal Brexit. Even as polls place 
the Brexit Party below 2%, his contribution was only ever reflected within the Brexit process. This 
explains the observed discrepancy between the infinitesimal polling of the Brexit Party on the one 
hand, and its crushing victory in the 2019 EP election on the other. The relevance of Nigel Farage 
and his party increases as he is careful to include common right-wing conspiracist tropes in his 
discourse and as he appears willing to wage a pseudo-crusade against alleged external and internal 
enemies of Britain and ‘the West’, such as China and the ‘politically correct Left’. This is why Farage 
chose to employ similar tactics during the pandemic.  
Recent electoral success of the British Conservatives suggests that a majority of British voters are 
still willing to buy what Farage and his more soft-spoken populist counterpart, PM Boris Johnson, 
are selling. As Britain is rapidly heading toward a no-deal Brexit scenario due to the UK government’s 
apparent unwillingness to strike any kind of deal with the EU, thus fulfilling Farage’s long time aim, 
Farage is careful to confer novel relevancy to his party by setting the new goal of antagonizing China. 
To this end, Farage added the pandemic to his case against China. At the same time, his opposition 
to lockdown measures is not so much opposition directed at government policy as it is intended to 
work as a dog whistle against globalization and the ‘oppressive’ ‘Left’ collaborating with and never 
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